Aristotle’s Conception of the Soul
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DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7416162Keywords:
Aristotle, soul, life, perception, thinkingAbstract
The goal of this study is to bridge the gap between Aristotle’s ontology and his account of the soul and show that the former lays the groundwork for the latter. In this vein, the first part of the paper examines the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian ontology to address the question of how these concepts serve as the foundation for Aristotle’s account of definition. The second part of the paper attempts to show that not only Aristotle’s definition of the soul but also his more specific conception of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational soul needs to be understood in light of the aforementioned ontological framework.
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