From Logical Atomism to Contextual Ostentionalism The Meaning of Words in Wittgenstein

Abstract

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein defends the thesis of the correspondence of language and the world according to the logical atomist model. Thus, names refer to objects; the two are directly connected. The meaning of words is determined by the simple objects as logical units they correspond to, and a strong view of referential language is advanced. In the Investigations, however, Wittgenstein shifts the problem of the meaning of words from the object itself to the act of pointing to the object. By investigating the possibility of ostensive definition, the meaning of words is linked to contextual ostentions as units pointed to and embedded in a social background. The meaning of words is therefore clarified by contextual description rather than by logical analysis. In this respect, the referentiality approach that shapes the theoretical and logical account of Tractarian language structure is weakened but also preserved in a loosened manner in contextual ostentionalism. Regarding certain uses of language, the meaning of words is contextually associated with objects ordinarily and practically. It therefore becomes possible to argue for a continuity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy within the framework of this problematic. This article will demonstrate this continuity within certain limits and elucidate the problem concerning the meaning of words that Wittgenstein refined