Morality in the Ontologies of Schopenhauer and Sartre

Abstract

This article compares Schopenhauer’s and Sartre’s notions of morality. Schopenhauer has allowed for little space for human beings to establish their morality, whereas Sartre has opened it up unlimitedly. In an attempt at explaining this crucial difference between the two philosophers, the article aims to shed light on the relationship between their ontologies and their notions of morality. Schopenhauer makes a distinction between will and its representations. He thinks that will stands at the center and maintains its existence unconsciously through its representations. For Schopenhauer, the world of representations has to comply with the principle of sufficient reason, so it does not involve any such thing as freedom. Being part of this world of representations, human beings do not have any freedom, and being unfree, they cannot establish any moral values either. Sartre, on the other hand, argues that human beings are ontologically free and in fact are condemned to be free. In contrast with Schopenhauer’s notion of the will, Sartre holds that "being-for- itself" constantly reproduces itself on the basis of emptiness, that is, nothingness and without being bound by any limitations. This reality forces human beings to establish their own values and morality